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Abstract: 
 
Many studies have found that variation in music training is associated with intellectual abilities, 
but research disagrees over whether music education should primarily correlate with general 
intelligence (g) or with specific lower-level cognitive abilities (e.g., fluid reasoning, verbal 
ability, or spatial reasoning). Past research, however, has not modeled the data in ways that can 
separate general abilities like g from specific abilities. To examine if the associations between 
music training and intelligence are general, specific, or both, a bifactor modeling approach was 
applied to data from a sample of 237 young adults who varied substantially in musical expertise. 
People completed a range of tasks that measured several lower-order abilities: fluid intelligence, 
crystallized intelligence (vocabulary knowledge), verbal fluency, and auditory discrimination 
ability. Simple correlations showed that music training correlated with all 4 lower-order abilities. 
A bifactor model, however, found that music training had both general (a strong association with 
g: β = .74 [.50, .98]) and specific (a moderate association with auditory ability: β = .37 [.08, .67]) 
relationships. The findings reconcile past research on the breadth of music training’s 
relationships and illustrate a fruitful method for identifying its links with cognitive abilities.  
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Article: 
 
Are people with more music training—from lessons, classes, and formal study—smarter? And if 
they are, in which domains of intelligence are they smarter? Research on the relationships 
between intellectual abilities and music education has a long history. Studies of “near 
abilities”—such as how music training correlates with the ability to discriminate musical 
sounds—go back nearly 100 years to the early development of musical aptitude tests (Seashore, 
1919). But studies of “far abilities”—such as how music training correlates with vocabulary size, 
spatial skills, executive functions, inductive reasoning, and other abilities seemingly remote from 
what people learn in music education—have attracted attention only recently (Forgeard, Winner, 
Norton, & Schlaug, 2008; Schellenberg, 2004, 2006). 
 
The generality of music training’s relationships with intellectual abilities is 
controversial. Schellenberg (2006) has argued that music training causes increases in 
intelligence, and that this effect is primarily general: Music training, he proposed, increases 
general intelligence (g) much more so than lower-level abilities. Research to date broadly 
supports this position, although many studies show a range of general and specific effects. In the 
present research, we present a new analytic approach that can tackle this issue more effectively. 
Thus far, research has largely used multiple regression methods with observed variables, and 
such methods cannot disentangle the contributions of higher-order abilities (such as g) and 
lower-level abilities (such as fluid reasoning or auditory discrimination ability). As we will 
show, bifactor latent variable models (Little, 2013; Reise, 2012) can simultaneously estimate 
higher-order and lower-order relationships, and they thus offer a practical framework for 
examining whether music training’s relationships are general, specific, or both. 
 
Music Training and Intelligence 
 
Research has shown that music training correlates strongly with “near abilities,” the cognitive 
skills targeted during music education. Since the development of music aptitude tests, such as the 
tests developed by Seashore (Seashore, Lewis, Saetveit, & R.C.A. Manufacturing, 1939) 
and Gordon (1965), studies have shown that people with more music training have substantial 
advantages in tasks that require discerning, reasoning about, and discriminating between pitches, 
rhythms, and melodies (e.g., Holahan, Saunders, & Goldberg, 2000; Law & Zentner, 
2012; Wallentin, Nielsen, Friis-Olivarius, Vuust, & Vuust, 2010). These effects are large, and it 
seems intuitive that intensive training in music can improve how people process and reason 
about musical information. 
 
The more controversial claim concerns “far abilities,” those skills that are not directly targeted 
during music education. Schellenberg (2004, 2006) has proposed that music training has broad, 
general effects that appear in tests of general intelligence. In his intervention experiment, 
students assigned to music education showed larger gains in full-scale IQ points than students 
assigned to drama education or to a control group (Schellenberg, 2004). Later correlational 
studies showed that individual differences in the duration of music training correlated about the 
same with many domains of intelligence (Schellenberg, 2006). Finding correlations between 
music training and factors such as fluid reasoning, verbal ability, visuospatial reasoning, and 
processing speed is intriguing and raises provocative questions about the causal and 
developmental pathways involved. On the other hand, some studies have found that music 
training correlates more strongly with some cognitive abilities than others (Degé, Kubicek, & 
Schwarzer, 2011; Forgeard et al., 2008; Schellenberg, 2011), such as vocabulary size and 
inductive reasoning but not visuospatial skills. On the whole, the literature on far transfer is 
controversial, and a recent review concluded that future research should examine the cognitive 
constructs at a finer, more differentiated level of detail (Jaschke, Eggermont, Honing, & 
Scherder, 2013). 
 
Differentiating Specific and General Effects 
 
The analytic methods used in research to date cannot discriminate between general and specific 
relationships. The reason is that lower-level cognitive abilities—like vocabulary size, fluid 
reasoning, and auditory discrimination ability—are themselves substantially correlated. Many 
theories of intelligence, such as the integrative Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) approach (McGrew, 
2009), contend that lower-order abilities correlate with each other because they share a common 
cause, such as the higher-order g factor. As a result, g contributes to variability in lower-order 
factors like fluid reasoning, verbal ability, and auditory ability, thus complicating the 
interpretation of simple correlations. 
 
The largest relationships with music training are found for auditory discrimination abilities, a 
cluster of “near abilities.” In the CHC model, these are located within the Gu factor of auditory 
abilities (Carroll, 1993). Many studies over the years have found that auditory discrimination 
tasks correlate with general intelligence (e.g., Brown, 1928) and with lower-order abilities such 
as fluid intelligence (Deary, 1994; Mosing, Pedersen, Madison, & Ullén, 2014), vocabulary size 
(Horn & Stankov, 1982), and visuospatial ability (Horn & Stankov, 1982). In their twin 
study, Mosing et al. (2014) found that fluid intelligence and auditory ability had common genetic 
influences as well as specific ones, consistent with the CHC view of auditory ability as a distinct 
lower-order ability influenced by g. 
 
Because lower-order abilities are strongly influenced by g, studies that analyze only the lower-
order abilities cannot separate the specific effects of those abilities from the general effects of g. 
In some cases, g could be the “third variable” that explains why music training and lower-order 
ability correlate. For example, a correlation between music training and vocabulary could simply 
reflect g’s relationship with both. The debate over whether music training’s correlations with 
cognitive abilities are primarily general or specific thus cannot be settled with regression models 
applied to observed variables, which are poorly suited for disentangling general and specific 
effects. 
 
Intelligence research, not surprisingly, has grappled with such problems in the past and has some 
useful analytic tools that can be brought to bear (e.g., Gustafsson, 2001; Kvist & Gustafsson, 
2008). Bifactor models, in particular, can separate higher-order and lower-order effects (Chen, 
Hayes, Carver, Laurenceau, & Zhang, 2012; Little, 2013; Reise, 2012). In a bifactor model, 
variation in an observed indicator, such as a test of fluid reasoning, is presumed to have three 
causes: an effect of a higher-order g factor, an effect of a lower-order fluid intelligence factor, 
and residual variance modeled as error. Because the higher-order and lower-order factors are 
modeled at the same time, researchers can evaluate their relative effects (e.g., which latent 
variable has a stronger effect on the test) and evaluate if they differentially predict other 
outcomes. 
 
A bifactor approach can thus shed light on the problem of whether music training’s relationships 
with intelligence are primarily general or specific. To do so, one would first establish a bifactor 
structure of cognitive abilities, including near abilities (e.g., auditory discrimination) and far 
abilities (e.g., fluid intelligence and verbal ability). Music training could then be included in the 
model, and its relationships with both g and the lower-order abilities can be assessed at the same 
time. One virtue of a bifactor approach is that it recognizes the possibility of both general and 
specific effects. Music training could conceivably predict g and several specific abilities, but 
such a pattern cannot be discerned using regression models with observed variables. 
 
The Present Research 
 
In the present research, we applied bifactor models to the problem of how music training predicts 
cognitive abilities. We recruited a sample of young adults that varied substantially in music 
training, from true novices to accomplished performers. People completed a wide range of 
cognitive tasks: the near ability of auditory discrimination ability, and far abilities of fluid 
intelligence (Gf), crystallized intelligence (Gc), and verbal fluency (broad retrieval ability; Gr). 
A bifactor model was used to simultaneously estimate the general g factor and the four specific 
Gf, Gc, Gr, and auditory factors. This design allows us to evaluate if music training’s 
relationship with intelligence is primarily general (i.e., it correlates with g but not with the four 
specific abilities), primarily specific (i.e., it correlates with at least one specific ability but not 
with g), or both (i.e., it correlates with g and with at least one specific ability). 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
A total of 265 young adults at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG) 
volunteered to participate. Nearly all of them (n = 255) participated as part of a research option 
in a psychology course. Ten additional participants were recruited because they were students 
enrolled in a graduate or undergraduate degree program in music (e.g., music performance, 
education, theory, or composition); they received $8. 
 
Several participants from the full sample were dropped prior to analysis. Participants who 
indicated that their native language was not English or Spanish (n = 15) were omitted because of 
the study’s substantial verbal emphasis (i.e., measures of English vocabulary and verbal fluency). 
We then applied checks for inattentive and careless responding (Meade & Craig, 2012) that have 
fared well in our past work (see McKibben & Silvia, 2015). Two directed response items—items 
that instruct participants to check a particular scale response—were embedded in the self-report 
items. We also included the Attentive Responding Scale (ARS), a set of 12 paired items 
(Maniaci & Rogge, 2014). People completed six at the start of the study and a nearly identical 
pair of six at the end, and the summed absolute deviation between the pairs was 
computed. Maniaci and Rogge’s (2014) work suggested using a cut-off of 6.5. Thirteen 
participants were omitted because they missed both directed response items, had an ARS score 
of 7 or higher, told the experimenter that they responded carelessly, or showed odd behavior 
during the study (e.g., falling asleep or compulsive giggling). 
 
The final sample (n = 237) was primarily female (77%, n = 182) and young (mean age = 19.08 
years, SD = 2.75, Mdn = 18, Min/Max = 18/40). According to self-reported racial and ethnic 
identification, the sample was 41% African American, 4% Asian American or Pacific Islander, 
54% European American, 8% Hispanic or Latino/a, and 4% Native American; people could 
select more than one option or decline to select any. Around 8% of the sample majored in music 
(n = 18). A subset of the sample (n = 183) provided data reported in an earlier article on 
personality and auditory discrimination ability (Thomas, Silvia, Nusbaum, Beaty, & Hodges, 
2015). 
 
Procedure 
 
The research project was approved by the UNCG Institutional Review Board (Study 14–0002). 
The participants took part in group sessions that ranged in size from one to eight people. The 
study was programmed and delivered using MediaLab (Empirisoft Corporation, 2012). After 
completing a consent form and hearing an overview of the study, people completed a series of 
cognitive tasks and self-report scales. The session lasted approximately 50 min. 
 
Fluid intelligence (Gf). We measured fluid intelligence with four tasks. A letter sets task 
presented five sets of four letters, and people had to identify the set that violated a rule followed 
by the other four sets (15 items, 4 min; Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976). A number 
series task presented a series of digits, and people had to discern the rule governing the series to 
indicate the number that would come next (15 items, 5 min; Thurstone, 1938). A series 
completion task presented a set of visual patterns that developed according to a rule, and people 
had to indicate which pattern would come next by discerning the rule (13 items, 3 min; Cattell & 
Cattell, 1961/2008). Finally, a paper-folding task presented images of a sheet of paper being 
folded and punched with holes, and people had to identify what the paper would look like when 
unfolded (10 items, 3 min; Ekstrom et al., 1976). All of these tasks have been used in our recent 
research (Beaty & Silvia, 2012, 2013; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011a; Nusbaum, Silvia, & Beaty, 
2014; Silvia & Beaty, 2012). 
 
Broad retrieval ability (Gr). Broad retrieval ability (Gr) was measured with three verbal 
fluency tasks used in our past work (Silvia, Beaty, & Nusbaum, 2013): listing words that start 
with M, synonyms for hot, and animals. People were given 60 s for each task. The tasks were 
scored for the total number of words after excluding repetitions, plurals, and irrelevant responses. 
 
Vocabulary (Gc). We measured crystallized intelligence (Gc) using an Extended Range 
Vocabulary Test (24 items) and an Advanced Vocabulary Test (18 items; Ekstrom et al., 1976). 
Participants had 8 min to complete both tests. Each test presented a word, and participants had to 
select a word or phrase that had the same or nearly the same meaning. 
 
Auditory discrimination ability. We measured auditory discrimination ability with the Musical 
Ear Test (MET; Wallentin et al., 2010). The MET has two sections: melody and rhythm. Each 
section presents short recorded pairs of musical patterns using a piano (melody) or a woodblock 
(rhythm); half the musical patterns are the same, and half are different. When the pair contains 
different patterns, there is a single violation. We used an abbreviated version of the MET in 
which people were presented 80 items—40 for melody (α = .70) and 40 for rhythm (α = .59). 
After listening to each sound pair (on overear headphones at a volume level that the participants 
could control), people indicated whether the patterns were same or different; chance performance 
was 50%. The order of the rhythm and melody sections was counterbalanced across participants, 
and the software recorded response times to detect if participants responded before the item 
finished playing. Each item’s duration was roughly 8 s, so MET scores were treated as missing 
for anyone who had an average response time of 7 s or less. 
 
Music training. Music training was measured by assessing experience with formal music 
education, as in past research (e.g., Krause, North, & Hewitt, 2015). First, we assessed the 
number of college-level classes in music participants had taken. As expected, given the sampling 
of undergraduate and graduate music students, the range was large (0 to 70). We thus treated the 
number of classes as a censored variable (Long, 1997): All scores of 10 or more were set to 10. 
Most of the sample had taken no classes related to music (n = 166, 70%); around 7% (n = 17) 
had taken five or more classes. Second, we assessed whether people played a musical instrument 
proficiently (scored 0 = no, 1 = yes). Around 30% of the sample (n = 70) reported playing an 
instrument. The range of music training was thus large in the sample. 
 
Results 
 
Data Reduction and Screening 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the tasks. All models were estimated in Mplus 7.3 
using maximum likelihood with robust standard errors. Confidence intervals (95% CI) are in 
brackets. 
 
 
Evaluating a Bifactor Model of Cognitive Abilities 
 
Before examining how music training predicts cognitive abilities, we first evaluated whether the 
cognitive abilities formed a coherent bifactor structure. We started by conducting a confirmatory 
factor analysis of the Gf, Gc, Gr, and auditory factors. For factors with two indicators (Gc and 
auditory ability), we constrained the paths to the indicators to be equal. All factor variances were 
fixed to 1. The model fit was good: χ2(40) = 65.611, p = .007, comparative fit index (CFI) = 
.941, root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .052; 90% CI, [.028, .074]; 
standardized root mean residual (SRMR) = .047. Figure 1 illustrates the model; Table 2 displays 
the correlations between the abilities. The factor correlations were all positive and consistent 
with a shared higher-order g, but not so high that the lower-order abilities appear redundant. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A confirmatory factor analysis of Gf, Gc, Gr, and auditory ability. Note that n = 237. 
The regression weights are standardized. Gf = fluid intelligence; Gc = crystallized intelligence; 
Gr = broad retrieval ability; mel = melody; rhy = rhythm; series = series completion task; paper 
= paper-folding task; letter = letter sets task; number = number series task; Ext = Extended 
Range Vocabulary Test; Adv = Advanced Vocabulary Test; hot = synonyms for hot; animal = 
animals; m = words that start with the letter M. 
 
 
 
 
 
A bifactor model was thus estimated next. In this model, the indicators were predicted by a 
higher-order g factor and by their specific ability factors. The correlations between specific 
factors, and between the general factor and the specific factors, are fixed to zero in a bifactor 
model (Little, 2013; Reise, 2012). For specific factors with two indicators, the paths from the 
specific factor to the indicators were constrained to equal each other. The model fit was good: 
χ2(35) = 62.981, p = .003, CFI = .936, RMSEA = .058; 90% CI, [.034, .081]; SRMR = .043. 
 
Figure 2 depicts the bifactor model. A clear bifactor structure emerged: Both the higher-
order g factor and the specific ability factors had notable effects on the indicators. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. A bifactor model of the higher-order effects of g and the lower-order effects of Gf, Gc, 
Gr, and auditory ability. Note that n = 237. The regression weights are standardized. Gf = fluid 
intelligence; Gc = crystallized intelligence; Gr = broad retrieval ability; g = general intelligence; 
mel = melody; rhy = rhythm; series = series completion task; paper = paper-folding task; letter = 
letter sets task; number = number series task; Ext = Extended Range Vocabulary Test; Adv = 
Advanced Vocabulary Test; hot = synonyms for hot; animal = animals; m = words that start with 
the letter M. 
 
Music Training and Cognitive Abilities 
 
Because a bifactor model of cognitive abilities represented the data, we next turned to examining 
how music training predicted cognitive abilities. As noted earlier, a bifactor approach allows for 
simultaneously estimating relationships with a higher-order g as well as with lower-order 
abilities, so it is well suited to examining the generality or specificity of music training’s 
relationships. Music training was modeled as a latent variable with two indicators: whether 
people played an instrument (binary), and the number of music classes people had taken 
(censored). 
 
We started by examining the correlations between the latent music training variable and the four 
specific ability factors. As Table 2 shows, music training correlated with each of the specific 
cognitive abilities. The largest correlation was between music training and auditory 
discrimination ability (r = .74 [.56, .91]), consistent with much past research. 
 
We then included music training in the bifactor model described earlier. Music training was 
specified as an outcome, and the predictors were g and the specific Gf, Gc, Gr, and auditory 
factors. The model and results are shown in Figure 3. The bifactor structure indicated that music 
training’s relationships with the lower-order factors were largely due to its relationship 
with g. The effect of g on music training was substantial (β = .74 [.50, .98], p < .001). Of the 
specific factors, only auditory ability had a significant positive relationship with music training 
(β = .37 [.08, .67], p = .014). Most of the lower-order abilities had smaller effects in the negative 
direction. Both Gf (β = −.18 [−.39, .03], p = .100) and Gc (β = −.15 [−.48, .17], p = .348) had 
nonsignificant negative effects, and Gr had a significant negative effect (β = −.30 [−.55, 
−.05], p = .019). The findings thus suggest that music training’s positive relationship with 
auditory ability is both general (via higher g) and specific (via higher auditory discrimination 
ability). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. How g and the lower-order abilities (Gf, Gc, Gr, and auditory ability) predict music 
training. Note that n = 237. The regression weights are standardized. For clarity, the indicators 
are omitted; the cognitive abilities are specified as shown in Figure 2. Gf = fluid intelligence; Gc 
= crystallized intelligence; Gr = broad retrieval ability; g = general intelligence. 
 
Discussion 
 
Recent research suggests that variation in music education is correlated with cognitive abilities: 
People with more music training perform better on a range of cognitive tasks (Schellenberg, 
2006, 2011). The scope of these relationships, however, is controversial, particularly for 
relationships with outcomes that are far from the skills trained in music education. The present 
research illustrates how bifactor latent variable models can inform the controversy over the 
generality of music training’s relationships with intellectual factors. When the simple 
correlations between music training and lower-order abilities were estimated, music training 
correlated with all four lower-level abilities. But when a bifactor structure was specified, music 
training had a large association with g and a medium association with auditory ability. This 
pattern reveals that the simple correlations between music training and some of the factors (i.e., 
fluid and crystallized intelligence) were spurious and due to the shared association with g. 
 
The present findings thus extend and reconcile past research. On the one hand, we found support 
for Schellenberg’s (2006) contention that music training is primarily associated with general 
intelligence: The relation between music training and g was the largest effect in the bifactor 
model (see Figure 3). On the other hand, music training was also specifically related to auditory 
discrimination ability, which is consistent with the large literature on music education and 
auditory abilities. 
 
Our study is agnostic about the direction of the causal paths, and we have sought to avoid 
implying any particular causal direction. The small body of intervention studies (e.g., Moreno et 
al., 2011; Schellenberg, 2004) suggests that music training can bring about increased 
intelligence. Other research shows that intelligence predicts musical achievement (Ruthsatz, 
Detterman, Griscom, & Cirullo, 2008), a complex finding in itself. Higher intelligence makes it 
easier for people to master abstract knowledge and complex skills needed to advance in music, 
such as sight reading (Meinz & Hambrick, 2010). Moreover, access to institutions that can 
accelerate one’s musical skill (e.g., a university music program) will indirectly select for 
intelligence inasmuch as standardized test scores are considered in admissions. And finally, 
many other variables influence both intelligence and musical interest. Openness to experience, 
for example, strongly predicts engagement with music (Beaty et al., 2013; Chamorro-Premuzic 
& Furnham, 2007; Corrigall, Schellenberg, & Misura, 2013; Greenberg, Müllensiefen, Lamb, & 
Rentfrow, 2015; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011b), and it also prospectively predicts the growth of 
intelligence via the heightened novelty seeking and love of learning typical of high Openness 
(Raine, Reynolds, Venables, & Mednick, 2002; Ziegler, Danay, Heene, Asendorpf, & Bühner, 
2012). Likewise, the growing interest in biological approaches to music and intelligence suggests 
complex roles for genetics in the overlap and development of musical ability (Mosing et al., 
2014; Mosing, Madison, Pedersen, & Ullén, 2015; Schellenberg, 2015). 
 
The present findings offer good support for the CHC approach to auditory discrimination ability. 
As Carroll (1993) noted, auditory abilities have attracted relatively little attention, and fairly few 
studies have assessed them alongside many other CHC factors (see Horn & Stankov, 
1982; Stankov, 1978). The present findings are consistent with Carroll’s conception of auditory 
abilities as a distinct factor, and the high correlation of MET scores with seemingly different 
abilities—such as vocabulary knowledge and verbal fluency—is consistent with a shared 
influence of a higher-order factor such as g. One open question for future research is the 
specificity of musical information for relationships involving auditory discrimination ability and 
other cognitive abilities. Carroll speculated that tasks involving musical content might form a 
distinct facet, compared to tasks using nonmusical stimuli. This topic has not attracted much 
attention, although studies that have included musical and nonmusical tasks often find that they 
are only modestly correlated (Law & Zentner, 2012). Future studies on music training and 
auditory abilities should examine a broad range of auditory tasks to clarify how specific the 
effects of training might be. 
 
Similarly, future research should examine an expanded range of cognitive outcomes. We agree 
with Jaschke et al.’s (2013) conclusion that research should examine cognitive constructs at a 
finer level of detail. The present study examined several of the better-known CHC factors, but 
many interesting abilities were omitted. The Gf factor, for example, was predominantly inductive 
reasoning; quantitative reasoning, another major component of Gf (Carroll, 1993), was not 
represented. Likewise, visuospatial abilities, known as Vz in the CHC model, were not included 
as a distinct factor. Finally, research has found interesting effects for executive functions (Degé 
et al., 2011), which were not included here. The methodological strategy developed in the resent 
research should prove fruitful for future studies that seek to illuminate both higher-order and 
lower-order effects. 
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